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Probability theory: the science of plausible reasoning
[L]a théorie de la probabilité n’est au fond que le bon sens réduit au 
calcul: elle fait apprécier avec exactitude, ce que les esprits justes 
sentent par une sorte d’instinct, sans qu’il puissent souvent s’en rendre 
compte.
Pierre-Simon Laplace, 1812
Probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation…
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The example problem
Estimate and compare the rate of success r of two evolutionary 
methods M1 and M2 applied to a given problem (in short, the 
rate of success r of two experiments E1 and E2), given the 
observation of the result of two series of runs
E1 E2
13 runs 12 runs
4 successes 7 successes
9 failures 5 failures
What kind of problem is this?
Intuitively (“instinctively”), experiment E2 has a greater rate of success. 
We would like to express more precisely (“exactly”) the significance of 
the observed results
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Direct problems (sampling, deductive, …) 
We know the system (its state, its parameters…) and we want 
to tell what we can expect from observing it
S O
Examples
• Outcome of draws from an urn of know composition
• Outcome of tosses of a fair coin
• Value of optical flow given plane pitch 
• Outcome of runs of evolutionary experiment given rate of success
• …
Direct problems are conceptually “easy” (counting, geometry, 
elementary physics) although they can be technically challenging
(combinatorial theory…)
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Inverse problems (estimation, inductive, …) 
We know the outcome of a series of observations of the system 
and we want to estimate its properties (state, parameters…) 
S O
Examples
• Composition of urn from observation of outcome of draws
• Fairness of coin from observation of outcome of tosses
• Plane pitch from observation of optic flow 
• Rate of success of evolutionary experiment from observation of outcome of runs
• …
Inverse problems are conceptually “difficult” (we sometimes 
guess some properties of the system but the complete solution is




A probability is a numerical value representing our degree of 
belief (plausibility) in the truth of a proposition
Examples of propositions
• The urn contains four blue balls and six green balls
• The plane pitch is five degrees nose up 
• The rate of success of experiment E is 0.7 
•This definition is subjective (probability depends on our state 
of information)
•Subjective does not mean arbitrary
•The main requisite is consistency
• Two persons with the same information must obtain to the same 
numerical value
• Using the same information in different ways (e.g., updating 
progressively our belief or using all the information at the end…) must 
give the same result
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Cox rules for consistent reasoning
R.T. Cox [American Journal of Physics (1946), 14(1)1-13] derived the 
quantitative rules for consistent manipulation of degrees of 
belief (plausible reasoning). 
Consequences:
• There do not exist “new kinds of logic” for expert systems and similar AI 
systems
• Evolution should lead to the “implementation” of plausible reasoning in living 
beings, possibly  in approximated form due to the computational complexity of 
the exact solution of problems with a lot of information (information paradox)
• Either the methods of orthodox statistics reduce to these rules, or they are 
wrong
• …
There is (up to isomorphisms)
a unique calculus of plausible reasoning
The rules found by Cox correspond to Laplace’s assumptions
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Conditional probability P(A|B)
P(A|B) is the plausibility that the proposition A is true, given that B is true
• The link between A and B is logical, not causal (beware of the mind 
projection fallacy! [Jaynes])
• Example: A is a proposition about the color of a first ball drawn form an urn 
without looking at it, B is about a second ball drawn from the same urn 
• Example: the game of the three doors
• A probability should always be written as P(A|I), where I is the 
background information: probability is always relative, never absolute.
• We can define independence of propositions: given I, A is independent 
from B if the knowledge of B does not influence our assessment of the 
probability of A, i.e., P(A|B,I) = P(A|I): once again it is a logical
(informational) notion
• The hypothesis of independence means simply that we are not using the 
information carried by B, if any, in making our estimates for A. 
• We can use the hypothesis of independence when we know that B carries 
information about A but for some reason we don’t want to use it (we just 
obtain a worse estimate than we could have)
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Rules of consistent reasoning
0 ≤ P(A|I) ≤ 1
• Range of P(A|I), value for certainty of truth and falsity
• Sum rule 
P(A|I) + P(A|I) = 1
• Product rule
P(A,B|I) = P(A|B,I) · P(B|I)
(P(A|I) is our degree of belief in the falsity of the proposition A)
( A,B means “A and B”)
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Some consequences of the rules 
a a+Δa
• Set of mutually exclusive (alternative) propositions
• Exhaustive set of alternative propositions
• Bayes’ theorem
∑i P(Ai|I) ∫ p(A|I) dA
A+ΔA
A




∑i P(A,Bi|I) = P(A|I) ∫ p(A,B|I) dB = p(A|I) 
+∞
-∞
( p(A) is a probability density function)
P(A|B,I) = P(B|A,I) · P(A|I)P(B|I)
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Solving our inverse problem via Bayes’ theorem
P(S|O,I) P(O|S, I) ·P(O|I)
In general: we know the outcome of a series of observations of the 













p( r |{Oi}, I) =
p({Oi}| r, I) · p(r|I)
p({Oi}|I)
In our case: Estimate the rate of success r of an 
evolutionary given the observation of the outcomes {Oi} of 
a series of runs
p({Oi}| r, I) · p(r|I)
the evidence does not depend on r
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Updating our prior after the observation of a success
p(r|I) = const
• The prior distribution
(this kind of information typically follows from 
symmetry considerations, maximum entropy…)
• The likelihood of the observ. {O1 = success}
p(O1| r, I) = p( success | r, I) = r
(it’s the probability of success assuming 
that the success ratio is r)






• The posterior distribution P( r |{O1},I)
p( r |O1, I) ∝ p(O1| r, I) · p(r|I) ∝ r
we observed a success: constant 
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Further updating our posterior distribution…
• {O1 = success,O2 = failure}
p( r |O2, O1, I) ∝




we get no information on 
{O2} from {O1} if we 
know r: independence
p( r |O2, O1, I) ∝ r · (1-r)
p( r |O2,O1, I) ∝
p(O2| r, I) · p(r|O1,I) 









we observed a 
failure: constant 
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… to obtain the final posterior distributions
0 2/3 1
• {O1 = success, O2 = failure, O3 = success}









p({Oi}| r, I) ∝ rm · (1-r)(n-m)
We could have used all the observation at once 
considering them as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial 
(Cox’s consistency requirement) 
0
0 4/13 ≈ 0.31 7/12 ≈ 0.58 1
• Experiment E1 {4 successes, 9 failures}; Experiment E2 {7 successes, 5 failures}
p( r  |{Oi}E1 , I) ∝ r4 · (1-r  )9
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The solution of the inverse problem
0 1
Experiment E1 {4 successes, 9 failures}; Experiment E2 {7 successes, 5 failures}; 
p( r  |{Oi}E1 , I) = r4 · (1-r  )9













These probability density functions contain all the information 
conveyed by our observations (combined with our prior information)
WARNING: No probability concepts introduced beyond this point!
0
We can still process the pdfs to make the solution more perspicuous
By normalizing we obtain:
E2 E2 E2
E1E1E1
Manipulating the solution 16
Treatment of the solution 
Determine P(rE2 > rE1|{Oi}E1,{Oj}E2,I) and, more generally P(rE2 > α rE1|…)
































P(rE2 > rE1|…) ≈ 0.91
P(rE2 > 1.1 rE1|…) ≈ 0.87
P(rE2 > 1.2 rE1|…) ≈ 0.81
P(rE2 > 1.74 rE1|…) ≈ 0.5
…
…
Note that probability theory does 
not (and cannot) say if the result is 
“significant”. You need additional 
criteria for that. 
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Summarizing the posterior distribution
To define a “best” estimate you need to define the cost of being 
wrong. It’s an issue that pertains to decision theory. Different cost 
functions give different point estimates (median, mean, MAP…)
• Point estimates
The posterior distribution is not necessarily a Gaussian 
function. By approximating it with a Gaussian at the 
(unique!) maximum you obtain an error bar…
• Error bars
Given an percentage of the total probability (95%, 
99%, …), you can determine the shortest interval 
that “contains” this amount of  posterior probability…
• Confidence intervals
Once again, probability theory does not tell you how to summarize
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Conclusion
[L]a théorie de la probabilité n’est au fond que le bon sens réduit au 
calcul: elle fait apprécier avec exactitude, ce que les esprits justes 
sentent par une sorte d’instinct, sans qu’il puissent souvent s’en 
rendre compte. […] Par là, elle devient le supplément le plus heureux 
à l’ignorance et à la faiblesse de l’esprit humain. Si l’on considère 
[…] la vérité des principes qui lui servent de base […] on verra qu’il 
n’est point de science plus digne de nos méditations, et qu’il soit plus 
utile de faire entrer dans le système de l’instruction publique.
Pierre-Simon Laplace, 1812
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